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Why I'm not a Vegetarian, Part 3

Racism, Sexism, Speciesism

Two posts ago, I presented two arguments for vegetarianism: the Consequentialist Argument and the Argument from Moral Individualism. In my last post, I gave reasons for rejecting a crucial premise of the Argument from Moral Individualism. In the course of giving those reasons, we noted a fallacious connection people might make between meat-eating, on the one hand, and racism and sexism, on the other.

This connection echoed a common argumentative strategy for vegetarianism. It goes like this: It's OK to eat meat only if it's OK to be speciesist.¹ But speciesism is just as bad as racism and sexism. Since racism and sexism are immoral, speciesism is immoral. Thus, it's wrong to eat meat.

If this argument is right, then either racism and sexism are OK, or it's wrong to eat meat. Thinking about this argument, then, consider premise (9) from the Argument from Moral Individualism:

(9) If we treat individual A better than individual B, and if we do so simply because A is a member of our group (our race, our sex, our club or whatever) and B is not, then we are not morally justified in what we are doing.

The gist of (9) is that discrimination based on group membership is immoral. And we might think that (9) — or something like it — undergirds our conviction that racism and sexism are immoral. After all, if (9) is false, it is OK to treat one individual better than another simply because the first is a member of our group and the second isn't. But in this case, how can we condemn racism, sexism, and all the other vicious "isms"?

The Moral Relevance of Groups

I'm convinced that, not only is (9) wrong, we have much better reasons than (9) to condemn racism and sexism — reasons that we don't have for condemning speciesism.

The first thing to note in response to (9) is that we can group things however we want. For example, take a look at the collage below and consider the instructions listed below it.

[A] Put everything over 200lbs in one group and everything else in the other group.

[B] Put everything that's dressed in red in one group and everything else in the other group.

[C] Put all of the things that are nice to look at in one group and everything else in the other group.

[D] Put all of the things that can give and receive love in one group and everything else in the other group.

[E] Put everything that bears God's image in one group and everything else in the other group.

[A] through [E] put the same items into very different groups. For example, if we group the items according to [A], Michael Moore winds up with Mars, but not with any of the people in the collage. If we group according to [B], Moore winds up with the stapler and the tractor, but, again, not with any of the people. If we group according to [C], he winds up with the taco, the pig, and the number 7 (since abstract entities can't be looked at). But if we group according to [D], Moore winds up with all the people, plus (probably) the dog and (maybe) the pig. Finally, [E] puts Moore in a group with all the people (and nothing else).

Reflecting on the groups we get from [A] through [E], it should be obvious that [E] and [D] track morally relevant differences while [A] through [C] do not. It should also be obvious that this matters for the morality of discrimination based on group membership. If there's no morally relevant difference between two groups, then one shouldn't discriminate based on group membership. But if there is a morally relevant difference between two groups, then it might be OK to discriminate based on group membership, in which case (9) is false. In fact, as we'll see below, some morally relevant differences between groups make discrimination based on group membership look morally obligatory.

Counterexamples

Take another look at (9) and consider Scenarios 1 through 3, below:

Scenario 1

Riding home from school, I see a terrible car accident. Getting off my bike to help, I realize that there are three people in the car: my wife and her mother and our friend Erik.

Scenario 2

Driving home from the store, John Stockton sees a terrible car accident. Pulling over to help, he realizes that there are three people in the car: two of his teammates from the Utah Jazz (Karl Malone and Adrian Dantley) and Chris Garrett, whom he doesn't know.

Scenario 3

Walking home from his office, Cesar Millan sees a terrible car accident. Running to help, he discovers that his favorite dog is in the car with a lady he doesn't know.

Reflecting on these scenarios, I find myself convinced of the following: All else equal, Millan should help the lady first, Stockton should help his teammates first, and I should help my family first.²

Imagine Millan looking at the woman and the dog, all about to burn to death, and seriously wondering which he should reach for. Imagine Stockton looking at longtime friend and teammate Karl Malone and, instead of helping him, pulling the stranger from the flames. Imagine my wife in terrible pain wondering why I saved Erik instead of her.

I must choose between members of my own group (my family) and Erik, who isn't a member. Stockton must pick between members of his own group (his team) and a stranger who isn't. Millan must pick between members of his own group (human beings) and his favorite dog. In all three cases, I think, discrimination based on group membership is exactly what's called for.

So again, (9) seems false.

The Immorality of Racism and Sexism (but not Speciesism)

Reflecting on the above sections, we learn several lessons relevant to the moral status of racism, sexism and speciesism.

In Scenario 1, because she's a member of my group and Erik isn't, I'm morally obligated to save my wife before Erik. But I'm a guy and so is Erik; and my wife, obviously, is a woman. So the red circle below marks the group that's morally relevant in Scenario 1, and the green circle marks the morally irrelevant group. But this circle cuts across the boundaries drawn by sexism. This suggests an answer to the question, why is discrimination based on sex immoral?

In Scenario 2, because they're members of his group and Chris Garrett isn't, Stockton's morally obligated to save Malone and Dantley before Garrett. But Stockton and Garrett are white, while Malone and Dantley are black. So the red circle below marks the group that's morally relevant in Scenario 2, and the green circle marks the morally irrelevant group. But this circle cuts across the boundaries drawn by racism. This suggests an answer to the question, why is discrimination based on race immoral?

Reflecting on Scenarios 1 and 2, and the stuff we said in the second section of this post, I want to say that it is immoral to discriminate based on race or sex because race and sex are not morally relevant differences.

But now consider Scenario 3. Because she's a member of his group and the dog isn't, Millan is morally obligated to save the lady instead of his dog. And that's it, so far as I can see. The red circle gets things right, while the green circle looks like the sort of group we would get with a morally irrelevant criteria like [A], above.

So here's what I want to say in response to (9). When groups are divided over morally relevant differences, discriminating based on group membership can be OK. Racism and sexism are immoral, however, because racial and sexual differences are morally irrelevant. Speciesism, on the other hand, is OK. This is because the difference between being a person and being a cow or a dog (say) is as morally relevant as differences get.

C O F F E E  S H O P

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Do you agree with Blake's conclusions?

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That's all I want to say about the Argument from Moral Individualism. In my opinion, this argument for vegetarianism fails entirely, and we can easily reject it without having to worry about racism or sexism. But as I noted in my first post in this series, some people might be morally obligated to become vegetarians. I'll address this concern in my last post on vegetarianism.