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Why I'm Not a Vegetarian, Part 1

Vegetarianisms

Vegetarians come in two stripes: principled and unprincipled. Principled vegetarians don't eat meat because they think it's immoral.¹ Unprincipled vegetarians don't eat meat for the same reason I don't eat ice cream: They just don't like it. Principled vegetarians usually have arguments for their position. They think we ought to be principled vegetarians too. Some principled vegetarians wield these arguments with missionary zeal. Unprincipled vegetarians don't argue at all. If we want to eat meat, then we should, unprincipled vegetarians say.

A lot of my peers and professors are principled vegetarians. They have arguments for the immorality of eating meat, and these arguments have given me pause. How can I eat meat once I've acquired reasons for thinking I shouldn't? If I'm not sure it's OK to eat meat, then shouldn't I stop — at least until I've acquired good reason to think it is OK to eat meat?

In this post and the next couple, I'm going to look at two arguments for vegetarianism. Both come from Mylan Engel, a professor I had the privilege of studying under at Northern Illinois University. They aren't Engel's arguments exactly. The first abbreviates an argument he gives in "The Immorality of Eating Meat,"² and the second abbreviates an argument he gave at an NIU colloquium titled "Moral Individualism and its Implications."³ Admittedly, the arguments below are not as compelling as Engel's actual arguments. They capture the spirit of Engel's arguments, however — and in any case, I am only using them as springboards for discussion.

After you read this post, you should check out Engel's work yourself.⁴ It's quite good. Then, after you've chewed on Engel's work, you should read my subsequent posts and make an informed decision. That's what I say, at least.

The Consequentialist Argument for Vegetarianism

The first argument (which I'll call "The Consequentialist Argument for Vegetarianism") relies on the insights of utilitarianism.⁵ It goes as follows:

(1) By eating meat, we support factory farming.

(2) The benefits of factory farming are minuscule compared to the pain and suffering caused by factory farming.

Therefore,

(3) By eating meat, we support a practice that increases the overall amount of pain and suffering in the world. [from (1) and (2)]

(4) By increasing the overall amount of pain and suffering in the world, we make the world a worse place.

(5) Insofar as we are able, we are morally obligated to not support practices that make the world a worse place.

Therefore,

(6) Insofar as we are able, we are morally obligated to not eat meat. [from (3), (4) and (5)]

(7) We are able to avoid meat entirely.

Therefore,

(8) We are morally obligated to avoid meat entirely. [from (6) and (7)]

Looking just at the conclusion of this argument, many of us would think it's obviously false. But if it is, where does the argument go wrong?

Those of us who aren't ranchers or hunters get our meat from stores and restaurants. But stores and restaurants get their meat from factory farms.⁶ So, when we buy meat at stores and restaurants, we help keep a factory farm in business, and this means that (1) is true. Premise (2) looks true, too. I can't get into the details. But the point is, while burgers and chicken wings sound merely pleasant, factory farming sounds absolutely terrible.⁷ But since (1) and (2) entail (3), it looks like we should accept (3).

What about (4) and (5), then? Are they really even open to doubt? I'll bet you that, if we reflect seriously on them, we'll find that we already believe (4) and (5). But (6) follows from (4) and (5), so it looks like we should accept (6).

What should we make of (7), then? We can meet all of our dietary needs with beans, tofu, and other vegetarian foods, and we might even save money this way.⁸ So, assuming that we have a little self-control, (7) is true. (Or, at least it's true for those of us with normal American incomes who live within reach of a supermarket.) But (6) and (7) entail (8). So it looks like we're committed to (8), in which case we should quit eating meat.

The Argument from Moral Individualism

The second argument (which I'll call "The Argument from Moral Individualism) takes more of a Kantian approach.⁹ It goes as follows:

(9) If we treat individual A better than individual B, and if we do so simply because A is a member of our group (our race, our sex, our club, or whatever) and B is not, then we are not morally justified in what we are doing.

(10) We treat people better than we treat animals, and we do so simply because people are members of our group and animals are not.

Therefore,

(11) We are not morally justified in treating people better than we treat animals. [from (9) and (10)]

(12) We treat people better than animals every time we eat animals but not people.

Therefore,

(13) We are not morally justified in eating animals but not people. [from (11) and (12)]

Therefore,

(14) In order to be morally justified, we must either start eating people or quit eating animals. [from (13)]

(15) We would not be morally justified if we ate people.

Therefore,

(16) In order to be morally justified, we must quit eating animals. [from (14) and (15)]

Once again, we have a conclusion that seems false tacked to an argument that looks pretty good. The argument is definitely valid.¹⁰ So if there's a problem with it, the problem has to be with a premise that doesn't follow a "therefore." This leaves only (9), (10), (12), and (15). But which one of these is false?

For starters, (12) and (15) are both true, and obviously so. After all, is there really any doubt that we shouldn't eat people, or that, when we eat animals, we treat them worse than people, whom we don't eat?

What should we make of (10), then? When we eat hamburgers (for example), we know almost nothing about the animals we're eating. All we really know is that they were cows. So, if we think we are morally justified in eating hamburgers, we must think that this justification comes from the fact that we are eating cows. But in this case, we're treating people (ourselves) better than the cows we are eating, and we are doing so simply because they are cows and we are people. So it looks like (10) is true.

This leaves only (9), since all of the other premises follow from previous premises. But if we reject (9), then how can we condemn racism, sexism, and all the other vicious "isms"? It looks like (9) undergirds our belief that racism and sexism are immoral. But if we won't give up (9), it looks like we're committed to the conclusion of the argument, and, once again, we should become vegetarians.

Why I'm Not a Vegetarian

C O F F E E  S H O P

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What are your thoughts on vegetarianism?

Join the discussion!

These arguments are worth taking seriously, I think. I have thought hard about them for the last two years, and I doubt that they work. In upcoming posts, I'm going to say why. As you will see, while I think vegetarianism may be morally obligatory for some people, it's not morally obligatory for most people. Be warned, though. My background is epistemology, not ethics. Again, I encourage you to take a look at Mylan Engel's case for vegetarianism and decide for yourself.