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When Can You Blame a View for Someone's Actions?

A Girl Named Smith, a View Named Beta

In my last article, we considered three claims: that we should reject evolutionary theory because it leads to tragedies like Columbine, that we should reject Christianity because it leads to violence like Matthew Shepard's murder, and that we should reject fundamentalist Islam because it leads to terrorist attacks like 9/11.

In my last article, we also saw that our ability to blame a religion or worldview for something someone has done depends on the relationship between that worldview and the person's actions. We imagined a girl named Smith, and we let "Beta" stand for some religion, worldview or theory that Smith accepted. We imagined Smith performing some immoral action, and we called that action "stealing." Then we saw that, no matter what view and immoral action "Beta" and "stealing" stood for, one of the following relationships held between them:¹

1. Beta entailed that we should steal.
2. Beta suggested that we should steal.
3. Beta entailed that we shouldn't steal.
4. Beta suggested that we shouldn't steal.
5. Beta entailed that it's OK to steal (and also OK to not steal).
6. Beta suggested that it's OK to steal (and also OK to not steal).
7. Beta was silent on the moral status of stealing.²

We left off by asking, when would it be legitimate for us to blame Beta for Smith's stealing? We asked this because an answer would enable us to say whether we can blame evolutionary theory for Columbine, whether we can blame Christianity for Shepard's murder, and whether we can blame fundamentalist Islam for 9/11.

An Assumption

To see something important, suppose that, while Smith accepts Beta, she wasn't thinking about Beta when she stole. Suppose that Beta wasn't on Smith's mind at all when she stole — Smith's stealing had nothing to do with her belief in Beta.

In this case, no matter what the relationship is between Beta and stealing, it seems wrong to blame Beta for Smith's stealing. After all, in this case, Smith would have stolen even if she hadn't believed in Beta. From here on out, then, let's assume that Smith was reflecting on Beta when she stole.

The Easy Cases

Given this assumption, let's start with the easy cases.

If Beta entails that we shouldn't steal, then Smith went against Beta when she stole. In this case, we can't blame Beta for Smith's stealing. And the same holds if Beta suggests that we shouldn't steal. So, we can check off 3 and 4 as cases where we can't legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing, and we can register the following negative conclusion:

Negative Conclusion 1

If Beta entails or suggests that we shouldn't steal, then we cannot legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing.

But what if Beta entails that we should steal? Again, the answer seems obvious. In this case, Smith stole because Beta told her that she should, so Beta is to blame for Smith's stealing. We can check off case 1 as a case where we can legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing, and we can register our first positive conclusion:

Positive Conclusion 1

If Beta entails that we should steal, then we can legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing.

Case 2

What should we say about case 2, then? If Beta suggests that we should steal, can we legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing? The answer isn't so clear. Here's why.

On the one hand, Beta might suggest very strongly that we should steal, but, on the other hand, this suggestion might be very weak. If the suggestion is strong, then there is a tight analogy between this case and case 1 and it seems clear that Beta is to blame for Smith's stealing. But if the suggestion is weak, it's no longer clear what we should say.

What is clear, however, is that the stronger Beta suggests that we should steal, the more we can blame Beta for Smith's stealing. So, we have arrived at the following conditional conclusion:

Conditional Conclusion 1

If Beta suggests that we should steal, then the degree to which we can legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing depends on the strength of the suggestion. (The stronger the suggestion, the more we can legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing.)

Cases 5 and 6

If Beta entails that it's OK to steal (and OK to not steal), then Beta neither condemns stealing nor commands stealing. It tells us to do whatever we want. So, if Beta entails that it's OK for us to steal, can we blame Beta for Smith's stealing or not?

I can think of reasons for saying yes and other reasons for saying no.

On the one hand, if Beta entails that it's OK for us to steal, then Beta is neutral between stealing and not stealing, and Beta gives Smith no more reason to steal than it gives her to not steal. So, it's tempting to say that, if Smith's steals, that's her choice and ¬she's the one to blame.

But on the other hand, stealing is immoral. So, instead of entailing that it's OK to steal, Beta should entail that we shouldn't steal. Since (we are supposing) Beta doesn't entail that we shouldn't steal, Beta fails to do what it should do. So, it's tempting to blame Beta.

I confess some ambivalence toward these choices. Maybe we ought to hold Beta partially to blame. Since this seems an acceptable middle ground, let's tentatively record a second positive conclusion:

Positive Conclusion 2

If Beta entails that it's OK to steal (and OK to not steal), then Beta is partially to blame for Smith's stealing.

What should we say about case 6, then? Having come to a conclusion about case 5 and seen how case 2 differed from case 1, it seems safe to answer as follows:

Conditional Conclusion 2

If Beta suggests that it's OK to steal (and OK to not steal), then the degree to which we can legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing depends on the strength of the suggestion. (The stronger the suggestion, the more we can legitimately blame Beta for Smith's stealing.) But even if the suggestion is very strong, Beta is only partially to blame for Smith's stealing.

Case 7

This leaves case 7, and the verdict here depends on the kind of view Beta is.

Suppose, for starters, that Beta is a major world religion, like Christianity or Islam. In this case, it's Beta's business to provide moral guidance. The fact that Beta is silent on stealing therefore counts against it. Consider: If Smith had accepted Christianity or Islam (for example) instead of Beta, then Smith would have known that stealing was immoral. Since Beta failed to tell Smith that stealing was immoral, it seems right to blame Beta for Smith's stealing.

But now suppose that Beta is a geological theory, or a mathematical theory, or a theory about JFK's true assassin. Beta is silent on the moral status of stealing, but this time it's not Beta's business to provide moral guidance. Beta didn't tell Smith that she shouldn't have stolen, but Beta wasn't supposed to. In this case, because Beta isn't about morality, it seems crazy to blame Beta for Smith's stealing.

So, reflecting on case 7 gives us our third conditional conclusion:

Conditional Conclusion 3

If Beta is silent on the moral status of stealing, then Beta can be blamed for Smith's stealing only if Beta has moral content — that is, only if Beta is a theory about right and wrong, only if Beta's in the business of providing moral guidance.

Christianity, Evolution, Islam

C O F F E E  S H O P

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What conclusions have you come to?

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So, can we legitimately blame Christianity for Matthew Shepard's murder, or evolutionary theory for Columbine, or fundamentalist Islam for 9/11? In my next article, we'll do our best to answer these questions. In the meantime, take a look at the conclusions we've reached and see if you can't form your own opinion.