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The Argument from Moral Disagreement, Part 3 (Including Complementary Haiku!)

Quick Recap

Here's where we stand: Two articles ago we noted a seemingly endless list of moral questions that white, upper middle-class American evangelicals would not be able to agree on. Then we noted that if anybody should be able to agree on a given moral question, it should be white, upper middle-class American evangelicals (after all, we're talking about a fairly homogenous group here). We also noted that race, ethnicity, social and economic boundaries, nationality, sectarianism and religious differences all contribute to the amount of disagreement we would expect to find between individuals, communities, cultures and so on. We concluded that if there is this much moral disagreement among white, upper middle-class American evangelicals, then how much more disagreement must there be worldwide, once we factor in the sensibilities of all the people in all the cultures? A lot, we were inclined to say.

Then, one article ago, we talked about the (so-called) argument from moral disagreement, according to which the amount of moral disagreement we see in the world gives us reason to think morality must be subjective rather than objective — that morality must be more like fashion than science, to put the distinction rather crudely. We saw that this argument didn't have a prayer of working if it was formulated deductively or inductively, and we concluded that if there is any convincing argument from moral disagreement at all it would have to be an abductive argument. Then we concluded that the argument would have to go roughly as follows:

The Argument From Moral Disagreement
(P-1) If morality were subjective, then there would be a lot of disagreement within the subject of morality.
(P-2) There is a lot of disagreement within the subject of morality.

Therefore,

(C) Morality is subjective.

So, here's the idea. We see a lot of moral disagreement in the world, and this fact calls for explanation. The best explanation is clearly that morality is subjective. Thus, we have good reason to conclude that morality is subjective.

Criteria for Logical Goodness

Is the argument from moral disagreement a good one, then? Well, only if (P-1) and (P-2) are true, and only if, given the truth of (P-1) and (P-2), the subjectivity of moral disagreement really is the best explanation for the amount of disagreement we see in the world. Unfortunately for the argument, there is reason to doubt all three of these claims.

Subjectivity and Disagreement

Let's start with the obvious and ask ourselves why we ought to think (P-1) is true.

(P-1) seems to assume that, in general, if judgments within subject S aren't objective, then we will find a lot of disagreement within S. But is this actually the case? There are at least two reasons for doubting it.

First, we find a surprising amount of agreement where matters of taste are concerned, yet matters of taste are paradigmatically subjective. For example, take the fact that shirts are usually made with buttons up the front rather than zippers up the front. Is there any objective sense in which a shirt with buttons up the front would be better than an identical shirt with a zipper up the front? In fact, can't we think of ways in which zippers would be better than buttons? Zippers are quite a bit faster than buttons, aren't they? Doesn't this make them more convenient than buttons? Yet everybody prefers buttons to zippers. So here we have a subjective judgment (that buttons are better than zippers) around which there is widespread agreement. And this gives us reason to doubt that, if judgments within some subject aren't objective, then we will find a lot of disagreement within that subject.¹

Second, even in many paradigmatic cases of subjective judgment where people don't hold the same opinions, there is arguably still little disagreement. People who like to study in the library typically do not take themselves to be in disagreement with people who like to study in their dorm rooms; communities where people put fences around their yards typically do not take themselves to be in disagreement with communities without fenced yards; cultures who shake hands typically do not take themselves to be in disagreement with cultures that kiss on the cheek; and so on. In all of these cases, those making the subjective judgments recognize that their judgments are subjective. As a result, they happily regard their judgments as expressions, not of what is and is not moral, but as expressions of their own tastes.

When I say chocolate is the best, I don't mean that you are wrong to like vanilla. I simply mean that chocolate suits my tastes better than vanilla suits my tastes. But if morality were subjective, why wouldn't two cultures with different moral sensibilities hold exactly this kind of attitude?

According to (P-1), if morality were subjective, then there would be a lot of disagreement within the subject of morality. But why think a thing like this? If morality really were subjective, why shouldn't we expect (say) polygamists and monogamists to regard their different attitudes toward polygamy and monogamy as roughly analogous to our different attitudes toward chocolate and vanilla? The point is, subjectivity often does not lead to disagreement, so why should we assume that, if morality were subjective, then we would see a lot of disagreement over it? Lacking a good answer to this question, it seems irrational for us to accept (P-1).

How Much Disagreement is There, Really?

Let us turn our attention to (P-2), then. According to (P-2), there is a lot of moral disagreement in the world. But why think this is true? Again, there are reasons to doubt it.

For starters, upon close inspection, many apparent moral disagreements no longer appear to be disagreements at all.

Where the people of one culture say it is wrong to X and the people of another culture say it is OK to X, very often, the different judgments of the respective cultures reflect the fact that Xing communicates one thing in one culture and another thing in the other culture. Moreover, where this is the case, the respective cultures often agree over what ought and ought not to be communicated.

For example, a "thumbs-up" in American culture communicates encouragement, whereas, in Thai culture, "thumbs-up" communicates disrespect. Yet both cultures agree that one ought to be encouraging and respectful. So, here we have a case of apparent moral disagreement (it's morally appropriate to give someone a thumbs-up versus it's morally inappropriate to give someone a thumbs-up) that turns out to not be a case of disagreement at all.

Second, while a lot of apparent moral disagreements really are disagreements, upon close analysis, many of them no longer appear to be disagreements about morality.

Take, for example, the abortion debate. Very few on the pro-choice side think abortion would be morally justified if fetuses were human persons, and most on the pro-life side think abortion would be morally justified (or, at least, that it should be legalized) if fetuses were not human persons. So both sides agree to the following:

If fetuses are human persons, then abortion is not morally permissible. But if fetuses are not human persons, then there is no reason why abortion ought to be illegal.

So the whole debate turns on the question of whether or not fetuses are human persons. But this is a metaphysical question, not a moral question. There is an important sense, then, in which the abortion debate is really more of a metaphysical debate than a moral debate. And it turns out that many other apparent moral debates are really better thought of as metaphysical debates.²

So we have reason to suspect that a lot of apparent moral disagreements are not really disagreements at all, and we have reason to suspect that a lot of apparent moral disagreements that really are disagreements aren't really moral disagreements. The third reason for doubting (P-2) is that, even if most apparent moral disagreements were actual moral disagreements, it would still not be clear that there is a lot of moral disagreement in the world. After all, the world might still be better characterized in terms of moral agreement than in terms of moral disagreement.

Consider the following facts in combination:

(A) Most cultures on earth discourage what they regard as immoral behavior with punishment or other negative consequences for such behavior.
(B) It is surprisingly easy to arrive in a country about which you know very little, interact with the inhabitants of that country more or less the way you interact with the inhabitants of your own country, and stay out of trouble.

Imagine yourself bailing out of an airplane and parachuting down toward X-land, about which you know next to nothing. You want to avoid trouble once you're on the ground in X-land, and you know that this will require you to avoid behavior that the inhabitants of X-land regard as immoral.

Given this knowledge, would it be at all rational for you to wonder whether or not you ought to greet X-landers with a kick in the shin? Would it be at all rational for you to worry that it might not be OK to blink your eyes in a conversation with an X-lander, or to wonder if it would OK to walk on your feet instead of your hands in X-land? Would it be at all rational for you wonder whether or not, in X-land, you ought to get romantically involved with someone's wife? Would it be rational for you to wonder if, in X-land, you could meet your needs, not by working, but by taking whatever you want from the homes of strangers?

Clearly not. In all of these cases, the answer is no. But X-land could be any country on earth. In light of all this, doesn't it seem right to say that there is a lot of moral agreement in the world?

Well, maybe not. But the point is that just as it's easy to tell a story that makes the amount of moral disagreement in the world salient, it's also easy to tell a story that makes the amount of moral agreement in the world salient.

In the first article in this series, we listed moral question after moral question where even a small homogenous subclass of the world's population (white, upper middle-class American evangelicals) would come to a different conclusion. However, we could have just as easily listed moral question after moral question where almost any human on the planet would have come to the same conclusion. In that case, if it would have been so easy to make the world look like a place where there is a surprising amount of agreement about morality, then why should we think (P-2) is true?

It seems that in addition to the argument from moral disagreement we could mount the following argument from moral agreement: There is a surprising amount of moral agreement in the world, and this fact calls for explanation. The best explanation for this fact is that morality is objective. Thus, we are justified in concluding that morality is objective.

So, here's the problem with (P-2): First, we have reason to suspect that a lot of apparent moral disagreements are not really disagreements at all. Second, we have reason to suspect that a lot of apparent moral disagreements that really are disagreements aren't really moral disagreements. Third, even focusing solely on genuine instances of moral disagreement, we have reason to suspect that we still see a lot more moral agreement in the world. Thus, we're in no position to think (P-2) is right.

And the Best Explanation is . . .

Even if we grant (P-1) and (P-2), the final (and perhaps most important) flaw in the argument from moral disagreement is that it is still not at all obvious that the best explanation for the amount of disagreement we find in the world is that morality is subjective.

J.L. Mackie, one of the best-known philosophers of the 20th century, forwarded exactly this argument against the objectivity of morality in his widely influential book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.³ As Mackie puts it, the argument from moral disagreement is forceful "simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions . . . of objective values."⁴

In my opinion, Mackie ought to be thoroughly embarrassed at having said this. It's not clear why we ought to think (P-1) is right; it's not clear why we ought to think (P-2) is right. Even if the argument didn't already suffer from these defects, why on earth should we think that the amount of disagreement we find in the world is best explained in terms of moral subjectivity?

If God exists and if the Bible is at all a reliable source for figuring out what sorts of creatures human beings are, then the biblical explanation for the amount of moral disagreement we find in the world is a perfectly good explanation. And most other religions can make similar claims. Since the argument from moral disagreement does not itself give us reason to reject any of the world's religions, each of their explanations is on the table as a competing explanation for the amount of moral disagreement we find in the world. Clearly, if the claims of any of these religions is true, then that morality is subjective is not the best explanation for the moral disagreement we find in the world.

But even atheists should find the argument from moral disagreement wanting. Suppose, for example, that some atheist (we'll call her Jane) thinks utilitarianism is correct, and that an action is morally right only if performing that action results in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. If Jane is right, then, any time it's hard to tell which of several possible actions will result in the greatest good for the greatest number of people, it will also be hard to tell which of several possible actions will be morally right. But then the fact that it's often hard to tell which of several possible actions will result in the greatest good for the greatest number would seem to Jane a perfectly good explanation for the amount of moral disagreement we find in the world. So it's not even clear why an atheist like Jane should find the argument from moral disagreement convincing.

C O F F E E  S H O P

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What do you think of Blake's conclusion?

Join the discussion!

My conclusion is this: Given the lack of any specifiable connection between the subjectivity/objectivity of some subject matter and the amount of disagreement we find within that subject matter, given the fact that it's not at all clear that there's very much moral disagreement in the world, and given that there are many viable explanations for the amount of disagreement we find in the world, it seems clear that there is no way to build a case from the amount of moral disagreement we find in the world to the conclusion that morality isn't objective.