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The Problem of Evil, Part 3: The Evidential Argument From Evil

In my last article, I argued that there is no logical tension between the proposition that

(1) God exists

and the proposition that

(2) Evil exists.

I then noted that, even if this is the case, the existence of evil might constitute strong evidence for the nonexistence of God — evidence strong enough to render theism irrational. As it turns out, this is exactly what atheologians are now arguing. As atheist Michael Martin notes, "[b]ecause of the failure of deductive arguments from evil [i.e., arguments attempting to show that (1) and (2) are inconsistent], atheologians have developed inductive or probabilistic arguments from evil for the nonexistence of God."¹

The gist of these arguments is that, given the existence of evils like last year's tsunami, God's existence is unlikely or improbable. Since these arguments claim that evil constitutes evidence for the nonexistence of God, we can call them "evidential arguments."

Evidential arguments differ from deductive arguments in a pretty significant way.

Two Pack Shaker

Consider the proposition that

(3) Tupac Shakur faked his death, changed his name to Dwayne Henry, paid a plastic surgeon to make him look like Seth Green, grew a blonde mullet and moved to eastern Montana, where he now owns and operates one of The Bling Bling State's many gas station/casinos.²

Now, I know Tupac was a musician in the "rap" tradition,³ and I know he was responsible for various Tupacalypses (pronounced "two – pack – ellipses," I believe) of the late 20th century. Other than that, I'm ignorant of most things Tupac. Thus I'm in no position to know for sure whether or not (3) is true.

Still, even my limited knowledge is sufficient for me to realize that (3) is wildly improbable. Given what I do know, not just about Tupac, but about the difficulty of faking a celebrity's death, the limits of plastic surgery and the allure of eastern Montana to a black gangsta rapper, I should form the belief that (3) is extremely unlikely. For me, the rational course with respect to (3) is the belief that it's probably false. Thus, even though I don't know for sure that (3) is false, I can't rationally accept it.

What People Should Believe

Suppose we call the argument in the above section "Argument A." Argument A is interesting in that its conclusion is about me rather than Tupac. Basically, Argument A concludes that, whether or not Tupac actually changed his name to Dwayne Henry, grew a mullet, et cetera — that is, whether or not (3) is true — it's irrational for me to believe that he did.

Evidential arguments are similar to Argument A in this respect. Rather than attempting to prove that God doesn't exist, they attempt to prove that it's rational to believe that He doesn't exist — or, sometimes, that it's irrational to believe that He does exist. Evidential arguments aren't about God as much as they're about what people should or shouldn't believe about God.

Suffering Fawns and the Rationality of Belief in God

Perhaps the best known evidential argument is William Rowe's.⁴ Rowe asks us to suppose that "in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the firs a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering."⁵

So far as we can tell, claims Rowe, "the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it would have had to occur had the fawn's suffering been prevented."⁶

Rowe's point is that an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being would allow the fawn to suffer only if the fawn's suffering was necessary for achieving some greater good or preventing some greater evil; yet the fawn's suffering doesn't appear to be necessary for either of these things.

Suppose the fawn was carrying some virus that would eventually destroy life on earth. God is omniscient and omnipotent, so He could have destroyed the virus without destroying the fawn. Why didn't He, then?

Suppose the fawn became food for a lost hiker on the verge of starvation. God could have killed the fawn quickly, in such a way that it didn't suffer at all. Again, why didn't He? No matter what greater good we suppose the fawn's suffering achieved, and no matter what greater evil we suppose it prevented, we'll have an extremely difficult time defending the claim that the fawn's suffering was really necessary. Why, then, did God allow it?

Rowe's Deductive Argument

Rowe asks the question, "Could an omnipotent, omniscient being have prevented the fawn's apparently pointless suffering?" The answer is obvious, says Rowe. Even the theist would admit that He could have.⁷ Given this admission, however, theists needs an answer to the following argument:

(4) There exist instances of intense suffering (such as the fawn's) which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(5) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

Therefore,

(6) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.⁸

This argument is clearly valid. If (4) and (5) are true, then so is (6). Are (4) and (5) true, then?

According to Rowe, (5) "seems to express a belief that accords with our basic moral principles, principles shared by both theists and nontheists. If we are to fault [this argument], therefore, it seems we must find some fault with its first premise."⁹ But as we have already seen in the example of the fawn, Rowe thinks (4) is true.

Rowe's Evidential Argument

Rowe is too sharp (and, in my opinion, too honest) to conclude that he's proven the nonexistence of God, however. For, as he puts it, "it must be acknowledged that the case of the fawn's apparently pointless suffering does not prove [italics his] that (4) is true. For even though we cannot see how the fawn's suffering is required to obtain some great good (or prevent some equally bad or worse evil), it hardly follows that it is not so required. … The truth is that we are not in a position to prove that (4) is true."¹⁰

C O F F E E  S H O P

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What do you think about the evidential argument from evil?

Join the discussion!

What is the significance of Rowe's argument, then? Well, according to Rowe himself, while we can't prove that (4) is true, we still have rational grounds for believing that it's true. Thus we have rational grounds for believing (6) — that God doesn't exist. The existence of apparently pointless evils such as the fawn's suffering, then, doesn't disprove the existence of God, but it does constitute powerful evidence for the nonexistence of God. Apparently pointless evils (such as the fawn's suffering) give us rational grounds for believing that God doesn't exist.

Read My Next Article

As is the case with the deductive argument from evil (see God, Evil and the Free Will Defense), there are good reasons to reject this argument. But I'm not going to tell you what they are. (So there!) If you really want to know (and you should), you'll have to do your own research, give it some serious thought, or read my next article. Since I want to be a successful author, I'd really prefer that you read my next article — or do some research and give it some serious thought and read my next article. Whatever you do, just read my next article.