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The Problem of Evil, Part 2: God, Evil and the Free Will Defense
It sure seems like the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically inconsistent. Blake shows how there's no need to come to this conclusion, however, as he continues his series on the problem of evil.
In part one of this series, I introduced the problem of evil via a handful of disturbing stories and the question How could God — being omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect — allow this to happen? Then I made a distinction between evil as a practical problem and evil as a theoretical problem, and promised to write about the latter. So, now I'm gonna.
Defenses vs. Theodicies
Within the context of philosophy and theology, "the problem of evil" often names an argument non-theists make for the conclusion that
(1) God exists
and
(2) Evil exists
are logically inconsistent — that is, that that they can't both be true. If (1) and (2) are logically inconsistent, however, then, since (2) is obviously true, (1) must be false.
Traditionally, theists have met the problem of evil with theodicies — attempts to show why an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being would allow evil. More recently, however, following the lead of Alvin Plantinga, theists have responded to the problem of evil by offering defenses.1 Rather than attempting to explain how God could allow evil, a defense tries to show that, even if we don't know how an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being could allow evil, it doesn't follow that an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being couldn't allow it. That is, even if we can't see how God could allow evil, it doesn't follow that (1)and (2) are logically inconsistent.
Defenses have an obvious advantage over theodicies.
Take, for example, a horribly evil event E — perhaps the painful, lonely death of an innocent child that drowned in last year's tsunami — and the claim that E is logically incompatible with the existence of God.2 While it's fairly easy to defend against this claim, for painfully obvious reasons it's extremely difficult to explain why an omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being would allow E.
Whatever good may have resulted from E, why wasn't God — being omnipotent and omniscient — able to bring about the same good via a less painful event? Or, if God was able to actualize this good via a less painful event, then — being wholly good — why didn't He? For a theodicy to solve the problem of evil, it must not only explain the existence of evil in general, it must answer detailed questions like these.
The Only Conclusive Philosophical Argument I Know Of
Now, very rarely are age-old philosophical debates settled in such a way that the philosophical community at large says Yes. That's correct. Next debate, please. Yet philosophers often talk as if the debate over the problem of evil has been settled in precisely this way. As Plantinga says in Warranted Christian Belief, most atheologians (people who defend athiesm and/or attack theism) have ditched the claim that God's existence is incompatible with the existence of evil.3 What Plantinga doesn't mention, however, is that he's the one primarily responsible for this fact. Hardly a single recent book on the subject (that is, recent in philosophical time — written within the last 20 years or so) fails to mention Plantinga's version of the Free Will defense, and most of these books site it as a success.4
How, then, does Plantinga's Free Will defense go?
Digression: Shaq Attack
It starts with the observation that, if there's a "proposition r whose conjunction with [(1)] is consistent and entails [(2)]," then (1)and (2) are logically consistent.5 What on earth does that mean? Well, consider two propositions:
(3) Shaquille O'Neal is an exceptionally poor free-throw shooter
and
(4) Shaquille plays in the NBA.
Now, perhaps you believe that, just as bachelors are, by definition, unmarried, NBA players are, by definition, good free-throw shooters. If you're right about this, then (3) and (4) aren't logically consistent. (That is, if (3) is true, then (4) is false, and vice versa.) But consider the proposition that
(5) Shaquille plays great defense, rebounds, and makes a lot of lay-ups for the Miami Heat.
Clearly enough, (5) is logically possible, and logically consistent with (3). Moreover, if Shaq plays for the Heat, then he plays in the NBA. So, it's impossible for (5) to be true while (4) is false. Put another way, (5) entails (4). A logically possible proposition is consistent with (3) and entails (4), however, only if (3) and (4) are themselves consistent. Thus (3) and (4) are consistent.6
Plantinga's argument is considerably subtler than this, though. For the proposition in question "need not be true or known to be true; it need not be so much as plausible. All that is required of it is that it be consistent with [(1)], and in conjunction with the latter entail [(2)]."7 Huh? I know, this isn't that easy to understand. We can get at Plantinga's point, however, by considering the proposition that
(6) Shaq plays for the Nuggets, and he made the team by winning the Kentucky Derby.
Obviously, (6) isn't only false; given Shaq's size, his inexperience as a jockey, and the irrelevance of the Kentucky Derby to pro basketball, it's completely unbelievable. (6) is logically possible, however. Moreover, (6) is consistent with (3), and it entails (4). Thus the logical consistency of (3) and (4) follows not just from (5), which is true, but from (6), which is both false and absurd.
Back to Plantinga's Free Will Defense
While Plantinga's argument is long and technical, the basic gist of it is simply that the proposition
(7) God is omnipotent and it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil
is possibly true.8 It might well be that (7) is true. The important thing to note, however, is that it doesn't need to be. Like (6) in relation to the logical consistency of (3) and (4), (7) could be false and still demonstrate that (1) and (2) are logically consistent. In fact, (7) doesn't even need to be likely for Plantinga's argument to work, and Plantinga can make the argument even if he doesn't himself believe (7). Interesting, eh? (Can I get an amen or, perhaps, a you betcha , fellow nerds?)
Anyhow, since (7) is logically compatible with
(1) God exists,
and entails
(2) Evil exists,
if (7) is even possibly true, then it follows that (1) and (2) are logically consistent and, therefore, that the existence of evil isn't a logical problem for the theist. Since Plantinga has given good reasons for thinking that (7) is possible, and since nobody has been able to demonstrate that it's not, most philosophers of religion have concluded that Plantinga's Free Will defense demonstrates that (1) and (2) are, indeed, logically consistent.9
Theodicies vs. Defenses
A few paragraphs ago I mentioned an advantage the defense has over the theodicy. Here, I'd like to point out that theodicies have advantages too. Among these is the fact that theodicies are conversation starters rather than a conversation stoppers. Rather than solving the problem of evil and making further dialogue about God unnecessary, theodicies encourage people to reflect deeply about the existence (and nonexistence) of God on many of the most important things in life.
One of the cool things about Plantinga's Free Will defense is that it's based on the Free Will theodicy and therefore manifests the strengths of both. Anyhow, I just wanted to point that out before moving to a slightly different, but obviously related subject.
An Easy Defense Against the Problem of Evil
Before graduating, many of you will find your faith under attack by a non-theist — perhaps, a belligerent and insensitive professor — who's not the slightest bit interested in conversation. In this scenario, it would be perfectly appropriate to offer a pure defense — one that would stop conversation flat. Fortunately, they're easy to come by.
Many theists and non-theists agree that, whether or not God exists, we humans are neither omnipotent, nor omniscient, nor morally perfect. Many theists and non-theists likewise agree that, whether or not God exists, we humans are finite beings. Given these facts, however, one could convincingly argue that
(8) God allows evil for reasons that are well beyond our comprehension
is possibly true. And since (8) is logically consistent with
(1) God exists
and entails
(2) Evil exists,
it follows that (1) and (2) are logically consistent. If (1) and (2) are logically consistent, however, then there's no theoretical problem of evil.
An Even Easier Defense Against the Problem of Evil
But things are even simpler than this. Suppose your intro philosophy prof is bent on attacking the theists in his/her class, and suppose that, if you mention the above argument, your prof will counter by challenging the possibility of (8). Perhaps (s)he'll say that, if God really has reasons for allowing evil, then, by definition, these reasons cannot be beyond human comprehension. Or perhaps (s)he'll argue: The sky is blue; therefore (8) isn't logically possible. Whatever. It doesn't really matter what argument your prof makes. If you're unable to defend the logical possibility of (8), you still have a virtually foolproof argument at your fingertips.
As a matter of fact, I, Blake, don't know why God allows evil. In order to defend against your prof's attacks, all you have to do is tell your prof that I don't know why God allows evil, then point out that, just as much as (8) is consistent with (1) and entails (2),
(9) God allows evil for reasons beyond Blake's comprehension
is consistent with (1) and entails (2). And since (9) is logically possible — no one in their right mind would dispute it10 — it follows that (1) and (2) are logically consistent. Thus there really is no problem of evil.
Evil as Evidence for the Nonexistence of God
C O F F E E S H O PIs there logical tension between God's existence and the existence of evil?
Join the discussion!
Actually, this isn't quite accurate. All (7), (8) and (9) show us is that evil's not a straightforward logical problem for theists. (1) and (2) don't have to be logically inconsistent, however, for evil to constitute strong evidence for the nonexistence of God, thus rendering theism irrational. And this is precisely what a lot of philosophers are now arguing.
How should we respond to this argument, then? I'll tickle (yes, that's right, tickle) this question in my next article.
- See pages 164 – 193 of his The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974) and pages 7 – 64 of his God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1974). Back^
- In case you're inclined to object, at this point, "all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God; therefore, no one — not even a child — is really innocent," let me point out that this is beside the point. Even though only God himself is completely innocent, some people still deserve to suffer more than others. Hitler, for instance, deserved to suffer more than Mother Teresa. You and I deserve it more than some of the children that died (or were orphaned) in the tsunami. The problem of evil consists more in the fact that people suffer earthly evils out of proportion to their behavior on earth than it consists in the bald fact that people suffer. Back^
- Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 462. Back^
- See, for example, William Rowe's Philosphy of Religion: An Introduction (Wadsworth, 1993), ch. 6; William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright's (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (Harcourt Brace, 1998), pp. 210 – 211; Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Temple, 1990), ch. 14; and Stephen Evans' Philosophy of Religion (InterVarsity, 1982), pp. 130 – 140. Back^
- See Plantinga, p. 165. Back^
-
In case this argument didn't make sense, read through the following propositions and think hard about the paragraphs between here and footnote 7:
(i) Jones is married
and
(ii) Jones is a bachelor,
(iii) Jones is a man
and
(iv) Jones is a human,
(v) Jones is a Democrat
and
(vi) Jones voted for Kerry.Two propositions are consistent if and only if they can both be true at the same time. Because (i) and (ii) can't both be true at the same time, (i) and (ii) aren't consistent. Because (iii) and (iv) can be true at the same time, (iii) and (iv) are consistent. One proposition entails another proposition if and only if the truth of the first proposition guarantees the truth of the second proposition. Because the truth of (iii) gaurantees the truth of (iv), (iii) entails (iv). Because the truth of (v) does not gaurantee the truth of (vi) — perhaps Jones voted for Bush, or perhaps he didn't vote at all — (v) does not entail (vi).
Now, consider any three propositions, proposition A, proposition B and proposition C. If A and B are consistent, then A and B can both be true at the same time. And if B entails C, then the truth of B would guarantee the truth of C. Therefore, if A and B are consistent, and B entails C, then A and B can both be true at the same time, and the truth of B would guarantee the truth of C. If A and B could be true at the same time and the truth of B would guarantee the truth of C, however, then A and C could be true at the same time. Thus, A and C are consistent.
Now consider,
(v) Jones is a Democrat,
(vii) Jones didn't vote,
and
(viii) Jones didn't vote for Kerry.Clearly, (v) and (vii) can both be true at the same time. The truth of (vii) also gaurantees the truth of (viii). Thus, if (v) and (vii) are true at the same time — say, at noon on March 16, 2006 — then (viii) is also true at noon on March 16, 2006. Thus (v) and (viii) can both be true at the same time. Thus (v) and (viii) are logically consistent.
Back to our conversation about Shaq, then. (3) and (5) can obviously be true at the same time, and the truth of (5) would obviously guarantee the truth of (4). Thus (5) shows that (3) and (4) are consistent because, if (3) and (5) can be true at the same time and the truth of (5) would gaurantee the truth of (4), then it follows that (3) and (4) can both be true at the same time. Make sense? Back^
- Plantinga, Alvin, p. 165. Back^
- See Ibid., pages 167 – 190, and pages 29 – 55 of his considerably more accesible God, Freedom and, Evil. In case you're curious (and you should be), Plantinga supports the claim that (7) is possibly true by showing that moral good seems to require moral freedom, which in turn appears to be impossible in the absence of moral evil. Back^
- That is, a right-minded person who didn't believe God's existence is itself impossible wouldn't dispute it. The person who believes this, however, has no need for the problem of evil, for, presumably, this person posseses some independent argument for the impossibility of God. Back^
- Recall the distinction I made in part one between the theoretical and practical problems created by evil. While Plantinga's Free Will defense shows that there's really no logical (i.e., theoretical) problem, it leaves the practical problem almost untouched. This is as it should be. The practical problem requires pastoral care, not philosophical explanation. Back^
Blake Roeber is a graduate student in philosophy at Northern Illinois University, but not for long. After completing his MA in the spring of '08, he'll start a PhD in philosophy at Rutgers.
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